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**Introduction**

This paper has been designed to support the quest of metropolitan areas of Guadalajara and Colima, Mexico to design effective structures for metropolitan governance.

The paper has two parts.

The first part is a review of literature on metropolitan governance from a global perspective, exploring the context, evolution of thought, models of governance, and the considerations for designing effective metropolitan governance arrangements.

The second part focuses on the specificities of urban Mexico, making a case for metropolitan governance. This part is derived from a combination of literature and interviews conducted with key stakeholders in the Guadalajara and Colima Metropolitan Areas.

**Part 1: Literature Review**

The literature review will:

- **a)** explain the **context** which explains the importance of metropolitan governance;
- **b)** define **key terms** and introduce readers to **evolution of thought** and research on metropolitan governance;
- **c)** introduce readers to the range of **metropolitan governance models** using examples from the Americas, Western Europe, and Australia; and
- **d)** highlight aspects of governance requiring consideration in the **design of metropolitan governance arrangements** and **options** while pointing readers to resources where they might learn more.

**Global Context for Metropolitan Governance**

Several recent developments have converged to make the international quest for effective metropolitan governance arrangements more important than ever.

Around the world, people are flocking to cities in search of opportunities for a higher quality of life. The percentage of people living in cities has increased from 13% in 1900 to 52% in 2011; cities will be home to 80% of the population in Latin America by 2025\(^1\) and 60% of the global population by 2030.\(^2\)

Urban regions are also changing, both in form and function. Clusters of adjacent cities have grown into metropolises—physically, economically, and culturally interconnected regions delivering services for increasingly diverse populations, served by multiple local governments as well as additional layers of government. Globalization has rearranged production worldwide, metropolitan economies are seen as the new competitive units in the global economy.\(^3\) Metropolitan areas are assuming an ever greater share of national production: Latin American metropolitan agglomerations (such as São Paulo and
Buenos Aires) concentrate more than 50% of the productive capacity of their countries, and are expected to contribute more than 80% of future economic growth. Municipalities grapple with new responsibilities offloaded by higher levels of government as well as the increasingly complex planning challenges that arise from jurisdictional questions. At the same time, it has become clear that high quality of urban life is a key element in success in the knowledge economy.

Changing economic and demographic realities are compounded by new environmental and social ones. Climate change, environmental degradation, and resource depletion—and all of the attendant risks to public health and energy security—lend new urgency to the need to develop planning and governance systems that treat the environment as the basis of healthy economies rather than as marginal to them. This is particularly so for urban areas, which are significant contributors to climate change and very vulnerable to its effects.

More than three decades of research on governance and sustainable urban development suggests that it requires greater control over urbanization processes; procedural justice systems that support greater participation of a wider range of urbanites; a fairer distribution of the benefits and costs of urban development; urban planning systems that are more integrated and holistic; and greater intervention of local government within urban systems to accomplish all of the above. Research has also shown that while local governments have great scope to address these issues and often do, the language of sustainable city design has also been used to justify programs that serve to normalize highly consumptive lifestyles and deepen the divide between rich and poor.

Mexico, like the rest of the world, faces tremendous expansion across its urban areas. In 1960, the Ministry of Social Development identified 12 metropolitan areas. By 2010, this number had grown to 59, most of which have a fragmented political and administrative capacity to manage shared interests across their municipal jurisdictions. Although government has begun to address planning at the metropolitan level (e.g. through the establishment of the Metropolitan Coordination of the Valley of Mexico; the enactment of the General Law of Human Settlements; and the creation of a national Metropolitan Fund to address public works and infrastructure projects in metropolitan areas), the more detailed questions of how municipalities can best work together remain to be answered.

**Key Terms**

**Metropolitan regions** are often defined solely on the basis of administrative or demographic variables, but the diversity in governance structures and absence of reliable statistics often makes this impractical. In this paper, metropolitan regions are defined by the complex nature of the social, economic, environmental, and political-administrative interdependencies that occur within their territories; intense interdependencies and externalities/spillovers among local territories; and a collective identity through their common functional socioeconomic, political, and historical characteristics.

**Governance** is the process by which human beings regulate their interdependencies in the context of shared environments. Governance is focused on sharing—from the scale of the household to that of the planet—and the protection and enhancement of the public realm, which includes tangible and intangible values such as streets and sidewalks, water resources and wildlife, markets and settlements, peace and prosperity. Governance includes a set of related processes—prescribing, invoking, applying, and enforcing rules that organize sharing and minimize the severity of trade-offs required to maximize values in a finite world.
Metropolitan governance operationalizes the definition of governance to metropolitan regions. It is “the process through which a set of governmental and non-governmental actors (civil associations, public-private partnerships, labor unions, enterprises, etc.) collaborate in terms of collective goods and policy making”\(^9\). Civil society refers to those aspects of human association based on the willing consent of participants (as contrasted to the necessarily coercive aspect of governments).\(^10\) Civil society is distinct from private-sector and non-governmental organizations.

**Evolution of Thought on Metropolitan Governance**

Debate about what metropolitan governance arrangements are most effective has continued for decades.

From at least the 1940s to the 1970s, the dominant school of thought (referred to variously as Metropolitan Reform, Consolidationists, or Regionalists) proposed annexing or consolidating increasingly adjacent, interdependent municipalities into one government. This, they argued, was needed to address key metropolitan problems, such as transportation, zoning, parks and recreation, water, sewage, public health, and housing. Proponents argued that a single government would be able to reap the benefits of economies of scale, and eliminate problems associated with multiple, fragmented governments: wasteful duplication of effort, disparities of service provision, and unintended effects of decisions in one jurisdiction on residents in another.

The Reform perspective was challenged by one known as Public Choice, which argued the opposite: equity, efficiency, and accountability in government were most likely to result from a system of multiple, fragmented governments—precisely because citizens and businesses could “vote with their feet” by moving from one jurisdiction to another.\(^11\) “Polycentric” political systems with multiple governments were seen as better at providing services on appropriate scales, simply because they admit variation and greater flexibility for local governments to enter into a variety of cooperative arrangements and agreements. The Public Choice perspective achieved popularity into the 1990s.

Evidence from governance systems around the world exists to support and refute the claims of both of these perspectives. Although the debate continues, it may boil down to personal and cultural values about what “effective” governance actually means: should it prioritize individual choice or provision of collective goods?\(^12\) In any case, a new school of thought has emerged, which at least some theorists see as a challenge to the “false dichotomy”\(^13\) of Public Choice and Reform: New Regionalism.

New Regionalism recognizes that local governments find numerous ways to cooperate to get things done. These include institutional solutions like single purpose (also known as “special purpose”) districts and regional councils and non-institutional solutions like informal agreements and coordination of existing structures through partnerships and higher levels of government. Forms of “Inter-local cooperation” range widely in terms of autonomy, structure, sectoral scope, flexibility, formality, accountability, and results. They sometimes overlap, compete, and cooperate, and they are dynamic—frequently evolving from informal, bilateral arrangements to more formalized structures involving more sectors or participants. Furthermore, New Regionalism recognizes and promotes key roles for civil society and business in governance.\(^14\)
To understand the wide range of governance arrangements, it is helpful to classify them according to some of their key distinguishing features. We turn to this task in Section 2.

**Untangling “New Regionalism”**

It is important to note here that research that uses the term New Regionalism actually refers to several different focuses. At least five focuses, or strands, of New Regionalism have been identified: competitive, cluster, territorial, redistributive, and cooperative regionalism. In practice and in theory, they are closely interconnected, but being able to distinguish between them enables readers to identify the focus of New Regionalism research: regimes of metropolitan governance, different approaches to economic development, or rescaling of the nation-state.

**Competitive regionalism** refers to the competitiveness of regions and is concerned with how regions can be made more competitive in a global economy; for example, through deregulation, privatization, promotion of foreign investment in regions, a more flexible labour force, development of clusters, and cooperation within the region to achieve this competitiveness.

**Cluster regionalism** refers to a focus on the renaissance of regional economies and new industrial districts, and highlights how spatial proximity of different companies facilitates communication, interactions, and cooperative behaviour leading to specialised economic clusters and labour forces that succeed in a global economy. Silicon Valley, Emilia Romagna and Baden-Württemberg are frequently cited examples, although critics have questioned whether cluster regionalism sufficiently accounts for differences in local histories, governance structures, and social capital.

**Territorial regionalism** refers to the somewhat contested thesis that sub-national regions are newly (and in this view, appropriately) assuming the economic policy formation function of the nation-state, while the nation-state simultaneously cedes powers to supra-national bodies like the European Union and international trade agreements.

**Cooperative regionalism** is the strand concerned with governance of regions, and/or regional development and service provision. It was developed by researchers who realized that rather than to try to resolve the reform-vs.-public choice debate, it makes more sense to study how metropolitan governance is actually happening (e.g. as more flexible, purpose-oriented networks of cooperation involving municipalities, governmental agencies from various levels, as well as private service providers).

**Redistributive regionalism** is concerned with socio-economic equity, regional revenue-sharing, and redistributive arrangements in cities. It proposes metropolitan-level solutions (such as quotas for provision of low-income housing) to race- and wealth-based spatial segregation, decaying infrastructures (particularly in central cities), and spill-over effects.

This paper does not try to evaluate each strand or compare one strand to another. However, it aligns with Kroen that cooperative regionalism most effectively represents an advancement of the metropolitan reform and public choice perspectives on metropolitan governance because it “takes the arguments of both sides into account and adds the necessity of negotiation and cooperation...”. Cooperative regionalism – in contrast to the metropolitan reform and public choice view – does not
claim to know the single best way to more effective metropolitan governance, but acknowledges that each region has to find its own way.\textsuperscript{20}

**Models of Metropolitan Governance**

Metropolitan governance models and their outcomes have been studied for more than 50 years. One salient theme of this effort is that, while there are undoubtedly best—or at least proven—practices for achieving specific governance goals, there are no readily transferable one-size-fits-all “best practice” prescriptions for good metropolitan governance.\textsuperscript{21}

This is due in part to the fact that the choice of how to define “effective” governance is inevitably as grounded in individual and cultural values, which are drawn from individual life experiences and the political histories and cultures of the places we call home, as it is in objectively verifiable facts. Values shape local priorities for governance, the choice of criteria to evaluate governance models and outcomes, and the choices of which data about our systems is worth collecting and recording.\textsuperscript{22} Different ways of collecting and recording data about the functioning of metropolitan governance systems thus complicates attempts to compare them. Even when comparable data is available and reliable, the emergence and performance of governance arrangements are often related to factors that are difficult to quantify or replicate, like a particularly charismatic leader, the role of social capital, or some unique and perhaps transitory constellation of political circumstances.\textsuperscript{23}

That said, researchers have developed typologies\textsuperscript{24} that can really aid understanding the range of qualities and emphases of metropolitan governance arrangements. These typologies establish categories for similar examples of metropolitan governance, but in practice, much variation exists within each category. Diverse forms of governance frequently co-exist (and sometimes, overlap) in one locale. Models tend to evolve over time due to historic, political, socio-economic conditions and in response to the “dynamic learning processes set in motion” in each metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{25} Typologies are by no means definitive, as they reflect researchers’ different understandings of what features best define and most powerfully predict governance performance.\textsuperscript{26} For example, metropolitan governance typologies are variously constructed to consider criteria such as size and density of the metropolitan area, level of formalization, nature of cooperation [voluntary or obligatory], number of sectors involved, extent of coverage of the metropolitan area, administrative structure, and level of fiscal autonomy.

The typology we present below is adapted from LeFevre’s typology, which roughly orders metropolitan governance models on a spectrum from greater to lower levels of institutionalization, political legitimacy, control over its own financial resources, geographic extent, and sectoral complexity.\textsuperscript{27} We have modified this typology somewhat by including models that amalgamate several municipalities into a single-tier government, as well as models that are “monosectoral” (dealing with one policy sector only) and that show little potential to become plurisectoral, as in a typology developed by Slack and Bird.\textsuperscript{28} This serves to broaden LeFevre’s spectrum somewhat, in acknowledgement that amalgamations and less integrated monosectoral approaches to metropolitan problems do figure among governance solutions chosen by local governments.\textsuperscript{29}

Table 1 provides an overview of this typology of models and the examples we will discuss in greater depth below. Our intent is not to compare the effectiveness of these models but to highlight the diversity of them as well as some different ways of looking at them.
Table 1: Metropolitan governance models

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A Typology of Metropolitan Governance Models

Governance may be embodied in institutional or non-institutional models. Institutional models involve the building of institutions, such as public metropolitan authorities. These may be in the form of local government units or a formal cooperation body between local governments with powers to govern in a policy sector or on part or the whole of a metropolitan area. Non-institutional models focus on more efficient coordination of policies in various sectors and at the area-wide level, using precise procedures, specific instruments, and formalized agreements.

1. Institutional modes of metropolitan governance take three forms: one-tier, two-tier/supramunicipal, or intermunicipal.

1.1 One-tier governance results from the amalgamation or annexation of adjacent municipalities into a single governing body. This body provides a wide range of services, financed through various user fees and taxes levied across the metropolitan area. Although Reform school advocated this form as optimal
for cost-reduction, efficiency, greater equity of service delivery, and accountability, the research on amalgmations shows mixed results.

The City of Toronto, Canada is the result of an amalgamation in 1998 of what is now referred to as Old Toronto and five surrounding municipalities. Like all Canadian municipalities, it is a creation of a senior level of government (the province), and as such, all bylaws passed by it are subject to change by provincial government.31

- **Powers / Responsibilities**: The City delivers a wide range of services, including social services such as welfare assistance; public health; housing; roads and transit; emergency services such as fire and ambulance; and parks, culture, and recreation.

- **Structure**: The City’s government comprises a directly elected mayor and council (councillors representing each of 44 geographically defined wards that make up the city). These serve four-year terms without term limits. City council is supported by seven standing committees, each consisting of a chair and vice-chair (named by the Mayor) and members appointed by City Council. Each standing committee has an executive committee (comprising the committee chair, the mayor, the deputy mayor, and four other councillors). Councillors are also appointed to oversee the Toronto Transit Commission and the Toronto Police Services Board. Four geographically defined community councils advise on local matters and include members of City Council. The City’s government is also advised by about 40 subcommittees and advisory committees, whose members include private citizen volunteers and city councillors appointed by the city council.

- **Funding**: City operations are funded by property taxes, provincial grants, user fees, and other revenues.

1.2 Two-tier (or supramunicipal) governance results from the introduction of a new tier of government which is independent of existing local units. LeFevre, who describes this as the “metropolitan government model” and the most refined (if least often seen) of all models, describes its five distinguishing features: a) political legitimacy through direct elections of decision-makers; b) a match between jurisdictional territory and functional territory; c) fiscal autonomy; d) relevant responsibilities and competences; and e) adequate staff to elaborate and implement policies.32 Strong forms include all five characteristics; weak forms include only a few.

**Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid** [CAM]33 was created by statute in 1983, and is one of 17 politically similar structures in Spain. The CAM includes 179 municipalities and covers most, but not all, of the metropolitan-area population. Its central city of Madrid accounts for more than half of the region’s population.

- **Powers / Responsibilities**: The CAM acts similarly to a federated state as in federated countries, and its powers supersede those of its component municipalities. It is responsible for urban development, housing, public works, highways, railroads, transport, ports and water resources. It shares authority with senior government in economic planning, industry, security, education, and health.

- **Structure**: CAM is administered by an assembly of 129 members, directly elected by CAM citizens through proportional representation and closed-party34 lists. The assembly makes regional laws and elects the president of the Community of Madrid by majority vote. The
president, who is usually the leader of the party or coalition with an absolute majority of seats in the assembly, designates (and can dismiss) a vice-president and nine councillors that form an executive cabinet. Assembly members form parliamentary groups who then elect members for committees that undertake Assembly work. Committees have their own chairs, vice-chairs, secretaries and spokespersons.

- **Funding:** The CAM is funded by its own resources (regional taxes), a share of the national income tax, and central government transfers. Like other autonomous communities, it can manage its financial resources as it sees fit.

Other “strong” examples include the Metropolitan District of Quito and the Greater London Council (1963-1986)\(^ {35} \). Weak examples include the Metropolitan District of Portland, which is metropolitan-wide and directly elected by voters, but with limited powers and responsibilities; and the Greater London Authority, which boasts the political legitimacy of a directly elected mayor and considerable responsibilities but no ability to raise its own financial resources, comparatively minimal staffing, and a mismatch between its functional and territorial jurisdiction.\(^ {36} \)

### 1.3 Intermunicipal joint authorities (IJAs)

IJAs create new institutions that are dependent for financing and functioning on existing units of government (e.g. municipalities) in the metropolitan area. They are based on cooperation between these units, and that may be voluntary or obligatory. Researchers have identified four subtypes of IJAs, based on the degree and nature of cooperation between them: metropolitan-wide; inframetropolitan; monosectoral with plurisectoral potential; and single-purpose special districts\(^ {37} \). Each of these is explained below.

#### 1.3.1 Metropolitan-wide IJAs

are described by LeFevre as “the most complete and constraining arrangement for municipalities (or any other local government unit involved)”\(^ {38} \). Although administered by indirectly elected boards (and thus lacking in political legitimacy), metropolitan-wide IJAs exhibit other key elements of the “metropolitan model”, such as a jurisdiction which closely matches the functional area, own financial resources, adequate funding, significant responsibilities, and adequate staffing.

France’s *communautés urbaines* were created to foster cooperation and joint administration among adjacent cities and towns. Cities over 250,000 are eligible to become *communautés urbaines*, and as of 2009 there were 16.\(^ {39} \) Although the first *communautés urbaines* were created in 1966, it was a 1999 statute known as the *Loi Chevènement* that clarified the relationship of the *communautés* to the state as well as their responsibilities and requirements for state assistance.

- **Powers / Responsibilities:** *communautés urbaines* must oversee public transport, environment, social housing, planning, economic development, culture, sewerage, and waste disposal.

- **Structure:** Historically, *communautés urbaines* have regulated by indirectly elected councils, composed proportionately of the representatives of member communities and headed by a president and vice-president who are elected by council members. The president is often the mayor of the central or most populous city, and vice-presidents are often mayors of member communities, and members are usually deputy mayors and councillors from member communities.\(^ {40} \)

- **Funding:** *Communautés* levy an area-wide business tax, taken from the municipal taxes; they also receive grants from the state and their member municipalities.
1.3.2 **Inframetropolitan intermunicipal IJAs** are plurisectoral and take many forms, but are alike in that they conduce intermunicipal cooperation only in parts of the metropolitan area. They vary with respect to responsibilities, powers, and funding.

The *Communauté Métropolitaine de Montreal* (CMM) was established by statute in 2001, and today covers 82 municipalities—about 90% of the metropolitan area known as Greater Montreal.

- **Powers / Responsibilities:** The CMM is responsible for air quality, economic development, environment, social and affordable housing, strategic and land use planning, culture, social housing, solid waste management, water, and metropolitan infrastructure.

- **Structure:** The CMM is an indirectly elected council chaired by the mayor of Montreal. Its members include 10 mayors from component municipalities, 13 councillors from amalgamated Montreal, and two councillors each from the larger municipalities of Laval and Longueuil.

- **Funding:** CMM activities are mostly funded by the contributions it collects from member municipalities. Contribution amounts are based on the CMM’s annual budget and distributed according to tax base size, with the exception of amounts related to specifically priced or otherwise regulated services. Municipalities collect amounts for these contributions through general or special taxes based on the property tax values.

Other examples include the ABC Region of São Paulo, Brazil.

1.3.3 **Monosectoral IJAs** with plurisectoral potential are metropolitan-wide, focus on one sector only, but show potential to move towards the administration of other policy sectors.

More than 60 transport alliances known as *Verkehrsverbund* (VV) are found in almost all large urban areas of Germany, serving about 85% of the country’s inhabitants. *Verkehrsverbund* coordinate multiple transportation providers with the goal of providing users with “one timetable, one fare, one ticket”. They often administer parking systems and are involved in urban land use planning, with the authority to oppose building permits or land settlements that would complicate public transport development. Hamburg’s *Verkehrsverbund*, which was the first organization of its kind when implemented in 1965, offers an example. It coordinates public transport by approximately nine rail operators, 22 bus companies, and one sea tourism and ferry company in three adjacent German states (Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony). These include.

- **Powers / Responsibilities:** Typical *Verkehrsverbund* duties include setting service levels and fares, distributing fare revenues among members, coordinating and publishing timetables; and marketing and public relations.

- **Structure:** *Verkehrsverbund* organizational structures vary considerably in terms of scale, separateness of administration, and mix of funding sources. Hamburg’s *Verkehrsverbund* includes representatives from three states and seven districts, a “general meeting” of 10 members, a 19-member supervisory board, and an executive. Transport companies exert influence through a company advisory council comprised of representatives of all of the member transport companies and three expert committees comprising transport company representatives. The supervisory board is also advised by a passenger council.

- **Funding:** *Verkehrsverbund* funding comes from fares as well as transfers from the national government, states, municipalities, and member companies. In the Hamburg *Verkehrsverbund,*
revenues are distributed among members according to the share of passengers they actually carry (as opposed to their carrying capacity), which creates an incentive for operators to make transport attractive and efficient.

1.3.4 Special districts are simply IJAs established to deliver services that straddle municipal boundaries, usually controlled indirectly by constituent municipal councils, but which focus on one policy sector only (and often those with significant externalities—such as waste management, transit, hospitals, or schools). They may involve any number of municipalities within a metropolitan area, but do not necessarily show potential to move towards administration of additional policy sectors.

TransMilenio is an example of a special district in Bogotá, Colombia. This public-private partnership launched a new bus system in 2000, replacing much of the unofficial, uncoordinated system in the central city of privately owned buses competing for passengers and space rented on routes controlled by organized crime. Transmilenio has since become the world’s largest bus rapid transit system, operating about 1,400 buses on a central network and some 410 fare-free “feeder” that connect the central network to outlying communities.

- **Powers / Responsibilities**: Transmilenio is exclusively concerned with planning and provision of bus rapid transit.
- **Structure**: Transmilenio is the product of a special company created by the then-mayor of Bogotá. Organizational structure is described at http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/es/articulos/organigrama
- **Funding**: Most of the money required to build Transmilenio was provided by the Colombian central government, with the remaining 30% provided by the city of Bogotá (through its Institute for Urban Development, which oversees public works). All revenues go into a trust fund, which is then redistributed among system agents according to the concession contract rules.

Special districts are common in the U.S.A., and particularly so in California which has more than 3,000 of them. Examples include the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and the Humboldt Bay Harbor Recreation and Conservation District. Mexico City and New York have also been cited as examples of metro governance by multiple special-purpose districts.

2. Non-institutional modes of governance are arranged through alternatives to institutions, and focus on more efficient coordination of policies in various sectors and at the area-wide level. These arrangements include coordination of existing structures and formalized agreements.

2.1 Coordination of existing structures, through precise procedures and specific instruments

These arrangements are often found in areas without a metropolitan institution, where bodies that carry out public policies are unable to manage metropolitan problems because of limited focus or jurisdiction. Cooperation is established at a wider level using specific instruments or arrangements as opposed to establishing new institutions.

The metropolitan area of Sydney, Australia is divided into 38 local government areas. These areas have elected councils which are responsible for functions delegated to them by the New South Wales State Government, such as planning and garbage collection. The metropolitan area has no clear metropolitan-wide authority. Citywide activities (e.g. public transport, main roads, traffic
control, policing, education above preschool level, and planning of major infrastructure projects) are largely controlled by the government of the state of New South Wales.

Another example is the Birmingham Community Strategy Partnership\textsuperscript{52} (BCSP) created in 2002. It was tasked with producing a strategic plan for this English city. The BCSP gathered the most significant public-private partnerships in the area, the City of Birmingham, the Chamber of Commerce, various business associations, the voluntary sector, and others. The process was directed by a coordinating committee.

2.2 Formalized agreements

Formal agreements are sometimes used to coordinate public actors and policies. They are typically monosectoral or limited to specific purposes (such as infrastructure financing), and depend on voluntary participation—which can leave them vulnerable to changing political tides.

The Italian procedure of Accordi di Programma facilitates cooperation between public authorities and between the public and private sectors. These are agreements that involve relevant public actors (public companies included) for the financing and execution of large infrastructure projects (e.g. subway systems, airports, rail stations, and world trade fairs). Development of these agreements takes place in a multiple-phase procedure, including a general meeting requested by either the mayor, the chairman of the province or the president of the region with all public actors concerned by the project; consensus-building among actors on financing, phasing, project implementation, and penalties for non-compliance with the agreement; approval of the program agreement by the regional council; and finally transformation of the agreement into law. Hundreds of program agreements are signed each year in Italy.

Designing Metropolitan Governance Arrangements

We turn now to selected aspects (by no means exhaustive) of governance to consider when designing arrangements for metropolitan governance:

- Accountability & Accessibility
- Cooperation Incentive
- Environment
- Fiscal Aspects
- Efficiency
- Equity
- Legitimacy
- Implementation

Ideally, these would be the subject of a metropolitan area-wide debate and visioning process that includes substantial public outreach, involves all relevant actors, and seeks consensus on the question “What would effective metropolitan governance look like – and how would we know when we have it?” It should articulate locally held values on these aspects and produce clear goals and objectives for metropolitan governance.
For each aspect, we highlight key questions, considerations, and options chosen by metropolitan regions around the world. Space prohibits detailed discussion of examples, but footnotes point readers to additional information and readings, all of which are included in the Bibliography.

**Accountability & Accessibility**

Accountability means that the people can openly discuss the activities and policies of metropolitan governance, and get their questions answered.\(^{53}\)

**Key questions:**
How will decision-makers be answerable to the people they govern? How will those who are governed know where to turn with questions? What will ensure the questions those governed are addressed?

**To consider:**
- The flexibility of New Regionalist approaches to metropolitan governance has made them increasingly popular, but evidence suggests this may come at a cost of accountability to those governed.\(^ {54}\) Directly electable, supra-regional structures are more accountable, but can leave citizens confused about who is responsible for what.
- Both direct and indirect election of decision-makers by geographically defined constituents can lead to regional decision-making hamstrung by parochial thinking. Direct election of at-large decision-makers can help, but not if voters don’t identify with the larger region.
- Accountability implies governance arrangements that aim for more genuine and meaningful public participation.\(^ {55}\) Corruption, fear of reprisal, and lack of transparency negate public participation.

**Options:**
- Decision-making bodies and their leaders can be directly elected, indirectly elected (i.e. elected by and from elected representatives), or appointed by elected representatives.\(^ {56}\) Members’ votes can be made proportionately representative. Directly elected members may represent geographically defined constituencies or be at-large representatives of the region. Decision-making structures may have representatives from geographically defined areas and at-large members.\(^ {57}\)
- Decision-making bodies should involve stakeholders and civil society.\(^ {58}\) Regular public hearings and specific days of debate of metropolitan policies should be mandatory, and held across the region.\(^ {59}\) Deliberative democracy tools like citizens’ juries and participatory budgeting processes make participation more meaningful.\(^ {60}\)
- Supra-regional structures can be linked to local levels through representatives from neighbourhood councils.\(^ {61}\) Regarding visibility of governing bodies, see [Legitimacy](#).

**Cooperation Incentive**

Clear articulation of incentives to cooperate for metropolitan governance is vital to maximize benefits and mitigate costs of cooperation.\(^ {62}\)

**Key questions:**
How will the arrangement stimulate cooperation and reinforce interdependence? How will decisions among interrelated sectors be coordinated?
To consider:
- Cooperation is easier to achieve in the provision of public services, and where there are fewer municipalities, fewer inter-municipal corporations, fewer counterparts to autonomous regional governments, and greater all-round gains for resolving the problem. It is less so when it involves distribution of scarce goods, resources, and undesirable burdens, or where costs and benefits of cooperation are poorly defined.  
- Externalities resulting from lack of inter-sectoral coordination can erode cooperation benefits.  
- Cooperation is a learning process, and builds social capital.  
- Senior levels of government can significantly influence the range of costs and benefits of cooperation for metropolitan governance. See Legitimacy.

Options:
- Employ “constitutive” policies that promote future development of governance arrangements; for example, develop frameworks for voluntary cooperation that leave the substance of that framework to be filled in by local actors / decision-makers (e.g. municipalities, stakeholders, civil society representatives). Craft legislation that enables, prescribes, and/or simplifies intermunicipal cooperation, perhaps through targeted initiatives, projects, or agreements.  
- Frameworks and legislation should include structural provisions that ensure coordination between interrelated policy sectors (e.g. economic development, infrastructure, environment, spatial planning). In special districts, foster coordination by placing certain individuals on more than one board, encouraging multifunction districts rather than single-purpose districts, and making decision-makers electable.  
- Make state funding support contingent on levels of cooperation inter-sectoral integration, as specified through contractual arrangements between higher and lower levels of government.  
- Reduce political costs of cooperation by fostering citizens’ identification with the region: see Legitimacy. Central governments can promote development of informal policy networks between actors to share information about policy alternatives, strengthen interpersonal ties and faith in procedural fairness, and thereby reduce costs of enforcing and monitoring cooperative agreements. They can also reduce costs of cooperating by providing administrative support and financial and regulatory supervision. States can also raise the costs of not cooperating by promising imposed solutions as an alternative.

Environment

Social and economic wellbeing is tied to the health of our natural environments. Metropolitan regions are tied to the health of much larger systems—such as our global climate. Governance arrangements must establish systems that integrate decision-making in all sectors with environmental management.

Key questions:
How will arrangements improve resource management and environmental concerns such as biodiversity, water quality, food security? How will they help mitigate (and improve resilience to) climate change?

To consider:
- Social inequality has environmental effects: poverty narrows access to environmental benefits and sustainable choices. Wealth broadens access to environmental benefits and choice, while
insulating people from the impacts of overconsumption. Governance must therefore go beyond green technological fixes to examine the power dynamics that produce unsustainable cities.70

- New Regionalism71 may or may not promote sustainability. Although it promotes thinking beyond borders, it coincides with the devolution of power to unelected power blocs and advancement of gentrification and consumption under the guise of greening—stretching capacities of local decision-makers to deal with environmental challenges72.

- Because losses from unchecked sprawl, incremental environmental degradation, and climate change are not always dramatic or visible, leadership and changes in political culture are at least as critical as incremental progress through agreements, partnerships, and institution-building.

**Options:**

- Senior governments can create laws to convene multi-level structures for metropolitan governance of environmental concerns, as with Argentina’s Watershed Committee for the Matanza-Riachuelo Basin.73 Participation can be voluntary or mandatory.

- Senior levels of government can make funding support conditional to cooperation within metropolitan regions on environmental concerns, as with statewide Transportation Improvement Programs in U.S.A. metropolitan regions74.

- Senior government can promote growth of informal policy networks that encourage cooperative solutions to collective-action environmental problems by providing funding, encouraging broad participation, establishing a focal policy arena with statutory legitimacy, disseminating information on successful approaches, and creating successful examples of regional institutional development.75 See Cooperation Incentive.

- Land-use planning that curbs sprawl can produce higher land prices and tax-burdens for low-income households76. Redistributive mechanisms can mitigate this (see Fiscal Aspects).

**Fiscal Aspects**

This concerns the tools and practices used to pay for metropolitan governance arrangements.

**Key questions:**

- Where will funding for administration and projects of the metropolitan governance arrangement come from? What revenue-raising tools will be used? Who controls the money? Under what conditions it may be spent?

**To consider:**

- At least part of funding typically comes from higher levels of government (as it does in Metropolitan District of Quito)77. Central government support through subsidies or grants should be regular, predictable, and transparent grants. Central governments can also offer new revenue-generating powers to regions.78

- Metropolitan institutions controlling their finances tend to thrive; those that don’t are often weakened by disputes among funders.79

- Good revenue-generating tools are efficient (see Efficiency), accountable (which is reduced if the tax can be shifted onto non-residents), affordable to administer, politically acceptable, and progressive (see Equity). They discourage corruption, reduce distorting impacts (e.g. urban sprawl), and promote efficient land use.

- Scaling up service provision to reduce per-capita expenditures does not always work80: economies of scale benefits can be achieved in some sectors of service provision, like water and
sewage, but that expenditures in others tend to arise, such as policing, waste collection, recreation, and because wages and service levels tend to harmonize upwards across regions.\textsuperscript{81}

**Options:**

- Revenue-generating means include user fees, property taxes, excise taxes (e.g. on activities or products), personal payroll taxes, income taxes, sales taxes, and business taxes. Development cost charges (widely used in Canada and the U.S.A.), public-private partnerships, and borrowing are also used. Slack and Bird (2008) offer a useful analysis of these options in terms described above.
- City services can be billed on a “life-line” pricing system (in which the first block of essential service use is billed more cheaply than the next) to address equity concerns.
- Tax-base sharing mechanisms can link efficiency and equity, as the Fiscal Disparity Plan has done in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan region.\textsuperscript{82} It redistributes 40% of the annual increase in tax base each municipality’s commercial-industrial property to needy municipalities, using formulas that consider net commercial tax capacity and average market value per capita. Benefits of rapid commercial or industrial growth in some communities are thus widely shared.

**Efficiency**

As it relates to metropolitan governance, efficiency can be considered as cost efficiency (for example, of service delivery or administration) and allocative efficiency (which looks at the efficiency in getting resources and services to where they are most needed).

**Key questions:**
What is the most cost-efficient way of governing metropolitan areas and delivering services in them?

**To consider:**

- It is difficult to draw comparisons on efficiency from one jurisdiction to another. Expenditures are not necessarily a good indicator of cost efficiency: some jurisdictions are just wealthier than others.
- Agreements or institutions that are forged to take advantage of economies of scale but which do not encompass the entire relevant region can create new vulnerabilities, or fail to ameliorate existing vulnerabilities, to region-wide spillovers.\textsuperscript{83}
- In some respects, amalgamations of municipalities can achieve economies of scale can deliver savings (such as cost of borrowing, reduction of duplicated effort, water, sewage). But cost savings across the board are not a given. Consolidation can raise costs as service levels and employee salaries / benefits tend to harmonize upward. Some expenditures (e.g. culture, policing, planning) also increase alongside greater social and economic diversity.\textsuperscript{84}
- In theory, small, fragmented government units stimulate competition between jurisdictions, thus driving costs down. But competitive behaviour can also promote a “race to the bottom” that imposes significant short- and long-term economic, social, and environmental costs on entire regions.
- Administrative efficiency requires that taxes are easy to administer locally, be imposed solely [or mainly] on local residents, and not raise problems of harmonization or competition among sub national governments or between sub national and national governments.
- See also discussion under **Fiscal Aspects**.
Options:

- Take stock careful of what costs will rise and what ones will fall as a result of greater cooperation and reduced competition among member governments, ideally using a triple-bottom-line (people/planet/profit) analysis.
- Bring decisions regarding service provision down to the lowest possible level to citizens: according to the subsidiary principle, this helps ensure resources are allocated with the greatest efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness.  

**Equity**

In the context of metropolitan governance, equity considerations relate both to disparities between groups of people and between regions, both in access to the benefits of urbanization and in the assumed share of its burdens.

**Key questions:**
How will metropolitan governance arrangements reduce disparity between the region’s rich and poor, and between its rich and poor sub-regions, and spread benefits and opportunities more evenly?

**To consider:**

- The goals of metropolitan governance and social equity are broadly consistent with the five key processes implied by sustainable urban development: a degree of control over the urbanization process; new systems of procedural justice to ensure a broader cross-section of urban denizens have the opportunity to influence the nature of urban development; deliberative attempts to secure more socioeconomic justice through active redistribution; more integrated and holistic systems of urban planning; and increased levels of local government intervention within urban systems to secure these objectives.
- Procedures or institutions that serve a redistributive function are usually contentious. More equally distributed tax burdens are not necessarily synonymous with equally distributed services or investments in infrastructure: political processes are still at play.
- Special districts are attractive as an incremental approach to metropolitan challenges; however, they are almost never created to serve social welfare functions. Furthermore, they have long been criticized as “low-visibility political arenas with little democratic accountability.”
- Equity also relates to sharing of burdens of economic growth and environmental degradation. Scholars like Robert Bullard and Julian Agyeman have highlighted the connections between urban development; race and class; and distributions of environmental risks and burdens, like waste facilities, emissions, and polluted water.

**Options:**

- Involve stakeholders and civil society in decision-making through regular public hearings, specific days of debate of metropolitan policies that are held across the region, meaningful engagement, and deliberative democracy tools like citizens’ juries and participatory budgeting processes. See also Legitimacy.
- See Fiscal Aspects, in particular the tax-base sharing Fiscal Disparity Plan of Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan region. Note that equalization transfers designed to address disparity should be transparent and formula-based (rather than discretionary) to reduce lobbying and corruption. Well-designed inclusionary zoning policies, common in many U.S. communities, promote affordable housing and more equitable land-use.
Legitimacy

Legitimacy has both functional and political dimensions. Functional legitimacy exists when metropolitan governance arrangements can actually elaborate and implement policies to solve relevant issues. Political legitimacy requires that those governed, as well as higher and lower levels of government, accept the arrangement. These connect: without sufficient resources and powers, even the most representative decision-makers risk being irrelevant.94

Key questions:
Are arrangements acceptable to those governed? Do they have appropriate and clearly defined powers and responsibilities, and sufficient resources to handle them?

To consider:
- Governance arrangements crafted by actors themselves enjoy greater political legitimacy than those imposed from above.95 Political legitimacy requires that those governed identify not just with the constituent parts of a metropolitan region, but with the region as a whole. Low political legitimacy results in invisibility, low election turnouts, and democratic deficit.
- Functional legitimacy requires that the metropolitan governance arrangements correspond to the actual territory governed, and be expandable to accommodate growth.
- Allocating functions among different levels of government is a political as well as technical process, often with trade-offs between institutions and changes in political personnel96.

Options:
- Ensure arrangements are properly resourced with well-defined powers and responsibilities, like the Rijnmond Corporation in the Netherlands.97
- Meaningfully involve civil society and stakeholders in planning, as in development of the Plan Estratégico Metropolitano de Barcelona98. Promote citizens’ identification with metropolitan region through cultural events, such as annual day of the metropolis, as in Hannover and Stuttgart, Germany. Balance new metropolitan governance arrangements with new powers for citizens, as in Montreal’s neighbourhood councils.
- Make arrangements more acceptable to communities that surround an otherwise dominant central city by reducing the weight of central city votes, as in Lyon and Nantes, France.99

Implementation

Metropolitan governance arrangements require time, negotiation between actors, and careful process.

Key questions:
What actors, resources, information, and time frames are required for new or better metropolitan governance? What are the trade-offs between approaches that are voluntary, bottom-up, and incremental approaches and speedier, top-down approaches?

To consider:
- Top-down imposition of metropolitan governance arrangements by higher levels of government may speed implementation of a formal solution, but are typically resisted. “Ready-made” proposals that cannot be significantly amended by local actors are frequently rejected in
referenda. Incremental approaches may build capacity for cooperation among actors, but require time to build legitimacy, trust, and norms of cooperation.

- Voluntary and monosectoral arrangements are easier to implement than non-voluntary or plurisectoral arrangements, but may come at a cost of stability, accountability, and coordination between sectors. Inclusion of key stakeholders and civil society in earlier stages strengthens political legitimacy and stability.

Options:

- Begin the process by taking the following steps: develop detailed forecasts of regional needs over 10- to 30+-year timeframes; identify systems (e.g. environment, infrastructure, communications, transportation) that would best be managed at the regional scale; review the effectiveness of existing institutions for governing these systems to identify gaps; generate procedural or institutional options to fill these gaps; identify incentives or powers to improve existing institutions and procedures or create new ones; create an ongoing process for financing, implementation, and monitoring of progress.
Part 2: The Case of Mexico

Metropolitan Governance: the Mexican context

Covering almost two million square km, Mexico is the fifth largest country in the Americas and the second most populous in Latin America. Mexico is a federation comprising thirty-one states and a Federal District, its capital and largest city. It has one of the world’s largest economies, and is considered a regional power and middle power, a newly industrialized country, with a GDP of US$1.261 trillion (2013) and a population of 122.3 million people (2013).

The country has a great potential to grow and increase the quality of life of its citizens, but pressures on natural resources and environmental outcomes need to be taken into account and dealt with. Costs of environmental degradation represented 5% of GDP in 2011. Air and water pollution are difficult problems to tackle as it is availability of good standard sanitation for everybody. In spite of all these issues, remarkable progress has been made in reducing poverty and inequality over the past fifteen years. Still, social indicators remain unfavourable by international comparison, and poverty has increased once again during the last recession.

However, the issues pointed out are mostly significant when the increased urbanization of the country is considered. Cities are increasingly the main foci of the problems mentioned, as they are magnified by density and lack of adequate infrastructure. Around 65 % of Mexicans live in cities (approximately 79.5 million people) facing increased congestion, lack of services and infrastructure. And nowhere these problems are more severe than in ‘metropolitan regions’.

Since the middle of last century, Mexico has experienced the relentless physical expansion of several of its cities which have spilled over other municipalities. Nowadays, a number of cities in the country exceed the limits of the territory that originally contained them and have spread over neighboring municipalities. In other cases, cities in contiguous municipalities have established physical contact, leading to "conurbations". There are also cities in neighboring municipalities that maintain a strong socioeconomic relationship between them without necessarily establishing an urban continuity. This phenomenon, by no means unique to Mexico, has since increased and created what is now called metropolitan regions\(^1\), urban entities that play a key role in the process of urbanization of the country. These metropolitan regions are characterized by their great concentration of population, the importance of their economic activities and fragmented administrative and political management.

The formation of metropolitan regions leads to the economic, social and technological development which generates a complex territorial structure with different components: the demographic concentration, the economic and functional specialization and the physical expansion of areas involving two or more political-administrative units that could be local, state or in some cases, extending beyond national boundaries. Thus metropolises are strategic spaces nationally and even internationally.

In all situations, the common denominator is an urban agglomeration or a metropolitan region or zone, which day-to-day operation must involve two or more political-administrative areas.

\[^1\] The term ‘metropolitan region’ originated in the United States in the nineteen twenties; it usually referred to a “big” city whose limits were considered beyond their original political-administrative territory; according to Sobrino (1993) this process began in Mexico during the forties in the cities of Mexico, Monterrey, Torreon, Tampico and Orizaba.
Mexican metropolitan regions have been traditionally described as a group of municipalities which interact and are located usually around a larger city. Since 2004, the National Council of Population (Consejo Nacional de Población-CONAPO), the Statistics, Geography and Informatics National Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática -INEGI) and the Social Development Secretariat (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social -SEDESOL) have defined metropolitan areas throughout the country, recognizing their importance in the planning of the National Urban System.

Since 2010, there are 59 metropolitan areas in Mexico, with approximately 69 million inhabitants, representing around 57% of the country population. There are eleven that have more than two million people, and they are growing 1.6%, when the country’s average is 1.1%.

Metropolitan regions or zones are defined as:
- a group of two or more municipalities where there is a city of 50,000 or more inhabitants that has a strong socio-economic influence over their neighboring municipalities;
- an urban region where there is a city with at least one million inhabitants;
- A city with 250,000 inhabitants which forms a conurbation with a USA city.  
(Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO, INEGI, 2012)

In Mexico, around 65% of the population lives in cities of different sizes and the share of population in metropolitan regions with more than 500,000 inhabitants is 53%. Metropolitan areas, in total, concentrate 67% of national GDP, the third highest value among OECD countries and 52% of employment. In 2000-10, they accounted for 62% of national GDP growth.
(Source: OECD Metropolitan Areas Database in OECD: Regions at a glance 2013).

Metropolitan areas are the highest level of the Mexican urban system; besides generating a large percent of national GDP and the employment opportunities they potentially can impact greatly on the economic and social development as well as establish environmental protection standards in their regions. Thus, in order to be key articulators of urban sustainable development, it is important that the participation of all stakeholders, from civil society (non-governmental organizations, private enterprise, educational institutions) to other levels of government (state and federal) to be engaged and coordinated in the promotion of concerted decision-making. However, there is a lack of comprehensive approaches that could support institutional frameworks that positively engages government and civil society stakeholders, in order to buttress necessary changes that would be directed and aimed to improve the performance of metropolitan regions in a sustainable way for their citizens, their economies and their environment (Spink, 2012).

Knowledge about the complexity of Mexican metropolitan regions is a critical topic to be discussed by all their stakeholders – citizens, politicians, institutions– so to provide a comprehensive understanding of the geographical distribution of population and the economic activities that could address the sustainable development of Mexico. Urban regions are key to the country development, both in terms of challenges as well as opportunities. This knowledge should direct urban actions and programs to promote better use of available resources in each region, and to foster development opportunities for all citizens when improving their quality of life.

According to Iturribarria (2007) urban economies in Mexico are mostly internal to the geographic area in which they are located. Urban economies should work as facilitators or "incubators" that could foster exchange of process inputs, availability of job opportunities and skilled labor, as well as the generation,
dissemination and accumulation of knowledge. However, regional and urban policies related to fostering intra and inter metropolitan regions cooperation have been hampered by the lack of approaches conducive to cooperation and complementarity in the relationships between cities and levels of government. These policies, when defined in a comprehensive and regional way, should promote and facilitate managerial learning, improving and increasing regional infrastructure broadly defined as physical infrastructure, but also the human and institutional capital.

In spite of all the foibles and shortcomings of last century rapid urbanization, Mexican metropolitan regions are now the foci of urban growth in the country, adding numbers to the complexity of systems involved in their day-to-day operation.

The management of these metropolitan areas involves the combination of several municipalities, and in some cases, also states or provinces, which may have plans and projects that do not necessarily coincide with the metropolitan municipalities’ goals and objectives. These difficulties are added to disagreements in addressing the problems of the metropolis within their component municipalities that may have urban differences in regulations, conflicting administrative arrangements and the lack of effective mechanisms for inter-sectorial and intergovernmental coordination. These issues represent serious obstacles for the proper functioning and development of the metropolis, particularly as it relates to the planning and regulation of their physical growth, the provision of public services and care for their environment.

Planning, coordination and administration are key instruments that have a direct impact on the pattern of spatial organization, spatial planning and the sustainability of metropolitan regions. And this presents new challenges in defining competencies and coordination between the three levels of government involved. Thus, metropolitan regions have serious challenges to overcome, from funding to pollution, and Mexico is particularly affected by this trend. And one of the most difficult issues to be dealt with is the governance of these agglomerations of cities.

In order to know more about this issue in Mexican metropolitan regions, two Mexican metropolitan regions were chosen as object for a deeper exploration of their management issues: Colima-Villa de Alvarez and Guadalajara. Albeit none of them can be considered a blueprint or model for the other existing metropolitan regions of the country, they can inform about practices, challenges and opportunities that could lead to a better understanding, and thus, a potential better guidance about how the management of these urban agglomerations could be conducted.

Metropolitan Region of Colima-Villa de Alvarez

The Metropolitan Region of Colima (MRC) was constituted in August 7, 1997 through an agreement among the five participant municipalities that defined the region limits and establishing, according to the federal legislation, that the geographical MRC area would comprise the whole surface of the participant municipalities. In 2011 the Inter-municipal Metropolitan Association of the State of Colima was created to strengthen municipal actions under a metropolitan integration system for improving the quality of life, social equity, territorial functionality and competitiveness as well as productivity of the whole MRC. It is important to point out that all municipalities involved (Colima, Comala, Coquimatlan, Cuauhtemoc and Villa de Alvarez) have maintained their constitutional autonomy and their competencies.
According to the 2010 census, the MRC had 334,240 people living in its five municipalities in an area of 2,287.6 square km.

The core city of this region is Colima, where almost 50% of the MRC population lives. Retaining also most of the region resources, employment opportunities and services, its leadership is recognized and some of its actions considered already regional in scope, since a metropolitan management structure is still to be defined. Colima government consists of a Council, led by the Municipal President (executive power), who implements the actions defined by the Council (legislative power). The Council is constituted by the Municipal President, a Trustee (sindico) who legally represents the Municipal Corporation, plus eleven advisors (regidores). The Municipal President and the Council are elected every three years and they cannot be re-elected for the immediate period after the ending of their mandate.

Colima offers basic urban services to its population, while holding two functions of metropolitan character: the treatment and disposal of solid waste and the slaughtering of animals for human consumption. The drinking water and sanitation services\(^2\) are performed by a municipal body covering the municipalities of Colima and Villa de Alvarez. Both cities form an urban continuity (conurbation), and are central municipalities. In terms of the external municipalities, Comala, Coquimatlan and Cuauhtemoc, they have functional integration and shared urban polices.

More recently (2013) and as part of the modernization and optimization of administrative services and promotion of local economies, the concept of ‘Municipal Business Center’ was implemented throughout the RMC municipalities using the example of Colima. This Center clusters offices of the three levels of government: federal, state and municipal, all linked to support the opening of business as well as providing municipal services such as building permits, operating licenses and payments of municipal services (source: SCI newsletter, 2013).

In terms of municipal obligations or competencies, the State of Colima Planning Act encourages municipalities to generate their own development plans, which includes the objectives on sustainable rural development, economic development, social development and urban equipment and infrastructure. The State Settlements Act also promotes that the cities should have their own programs of urban development and environmental planning. However, as a metropolitan region, the five MRC municipalities ideally would have a comprehensive planning framework that could guide their specific growth and development within a regional perspective.

**Metropolitan Region of Guadalajara**

The Metropolitan Region (MRG) is the most populous metropolitan area of the Mexican State of Jalisco and the second largest in the country after Greater Mexico City according to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) 2010 census. It includes the core municipality of Guadalajara and the surrounding municipalities of Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá, Tlajomulco de Zuñiga, El Salto, Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos and Juanacatlán. The Guadalajara Metropolitan Area had a total population of 4,434,878 people in 2010, in an area of 2,734 square km.

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\(^2\) Sanitation is understood as the collection, treatment and proper disposal of solid wastes, domestic wastewater (sewage, sullage, greywater), industrial wastes and agricultural wastes.
The MRG is centred in Guadalajara, its core city and capital of the State of Jalisco, the most populous and most historically significant of its cities, holding 1,495,189 people, 34% of the region’s population. The MRG is located in the central part of Jalisco State and is officially formed by eight municipalities, of which six are considered central municipalities, i.e. municipalities that are an aggregation or continuous network of urban communities, i.e., a conurbation. These six municipalities are Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonala, El Salto and Tlajomulco de Zuniga. The other two municipalities, Juanacatlán and Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos, in spite of belonging to the metropolitan area do not form part of this conurbation.

In March 6, 1989 the document ‘Acuerdo que crea el Metropolitano de Guadalajara Y Reglamento que Norma el Funcionamiento del Consejo Metropolitano de Guadalajara was signed by the Jalisco State Governor. This document was designed to install the Guadalajara Metropolitan Council, with the following priority tasks: a) organize and regulate urban growth; b) operate and administer efficiently public services; c) find effective ways to implement infrastructure and large-scale equipment; d) coordinate roads implementation and transportation services; e) implement a metropolitan system for solid waste collection and disposal; f) address air pollution and g) ensure public safety. The overall goal was to improve the quality of life of citizens and pursue a better and more efficient urban development of the Metropolitan Zone of Guadalajara.

Sources: [http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Estatal/JALISCO/Acuerdos/JALACU081.pdf](http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Estatal/JALISCO/Acuerdos/JALACU081.pdf) retrieved in October 18th 2014

The MRG has historically been a political and economic center and has had some prioritized development projects funded by state and municipal authorities. However, the MRG growing urban sprawl posed new challenges and required coordination between the three levels of government to enable adequate and comprehensive land planning, efficient management of public services and the full exercise of the rights of citizens, essential elements for good governance and sustainable development of metropolitan areas. To attend this need, the Metropolitan Planning Institute (IMEPLAN) was created in February 2011 to serve as advisor to the eight municipalities in the MRG. Its mandate encompasses the development of comprehensive planning and coordination instruments for the metropolitan region as well as to be in charge of the development and management of specific regional projects including looking for resources at the federal level. Presently, some of the pressing issues are the urban sprawl and mobility as well as education and health.


Most recently, the Metropolitan Council was implemented to face the challenges and complexities of the growing metropolitan region. Its objective is to pursue ways for an efficient urban development of the MRG, and it is composed by a President (a titular of Executive Power or its representative) and Councillors (Municipal Presidents or their representatives) and a Technical Secretary, dealing with the areas from rural and urban development, education and culture, transit, roads system, economic development, tourism and fisheries, health and social welfare, water and sanitation, and public security.


The MRG does not infer a single administrative entity, but the municipalities share the Metropolitan Council and the police force, the Metropolicia. The Metropolicía is a police force that is not a single command, but depends on the administration of each municipality, yet the Metropolicía, which is
responsible for the monitoring and protection of the six central municipalities (Guadalajara, El Salto, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, Tlaquepaque, Tonala and Zapopan). Metropolicia shares the same vehicle fleet, the same rules and the same equipment, plus the metropolicías of each municipality are authorized to enter any of the other neighbouring municipalities to chase any perpetrator or if there is a request for assistance. Potable water and sanitation are provided by the System of Potable Water, which provides service to four municipalities in the area: Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque and Tonala. The MRG strategic location has led in recent years to an increasing establishment of manufacturing companies with electronic and cyber vocation. Albeit this phenomenon strengthens the industrial structure of the area, it also becomes a major attraction for young people within the state who come in search of jobs and opportunities, which has inevitable consequences in traffic congestion and housing, transit and service’s needs. The economic potential of historic Guadalajara, strengthened by the adjacent municipalities has consolidated the MRG on as the second agglomeration in the country in terms of trade and one of the first in the volume of industrial production. Seventy five percent of the Jalisco State industries are located in this area and this makes it the main center of economic activities in the State and even Western Mexico.


Interview Results

In order to analyze and better understand the reality of metropolitan regions in Mexico, two metropolitan areas were selected and a series of interviews with key stakeholders was conducted. The Metropolitan Region of Colima-Villa de Alvarez (MRC) and the Metropolitan Region of Guadalajara (MRG) were chosen, considering that Guadalajara is one of the first to have an established institution for metropolitan management, the IMEPLAN, and the Metropolitan Council, and Colima-Villa de Alvarez is considerably advancing towards the establishment of a similar institutions. But by no means can they be considered as unique representatives or ‘models’ for all Mexican metropolitan regions. They do embody, however, the issues, challenges and opportunities perceived by major stakeholders in most of the 57 other metropolitan regions. There are, however, peculiarities and indigenous factors that should be examined in each case, in order to have a full picture of each metropolitan region.

The interviews were based in open-ended questions, and their objective was to identify how metropolitan governance is perceived by the stakeholders’ representatives, common themes, issues, challenges and interests they see as important. The questions were grouped in the following analytical aspects:

- **concepts**: defining governance, collaborative governance, “good governance”, intervening factors, key areas and benefits fostered by an efficient and democratic metropolitan governance framework;
- **context**: relevance of the metropolitan governance in each metropolitan urban scenario, how it is perceived and how necessary it is;
- **issues/challenges**: key aspects, assets or hindrances related to any proposed or in place governance framework implementation;
- **participation**: inclusiveness and regional engagement in discussion of regional problems and potential solutions both for the creation, implementation and operation of a metro governance structure;
- **decision making**: levels of decision making processes, involvement of stakeholders, evaluation and monitoring of implementation;
- **funding**: regional and local budgets, distribution of costs, taxes and grants, definition of fiscal responsibilities

Thirty three metropolitan stakeholders’ representatives were interviewed, of whom 17 were from the MRC and 16 from the MRG. The stakeholders interviewed were municipal presidents, representatives of state authorities, NGOs, private sector and academia, all of whom are directly engaged in comprehensive metropolitan and local planning processes, or are engaged in research related to metropolitan issues and challenges (see Annex 1 for the interviews’ questions and Annex 2 for the interviewees’ names, roles and institutional affiliation).

In the tables below, the main findings collected from the interviews are summarized according to defined analytical criteria.

**TABLE 1: The Metropolitan Region of Colima-Villa de Alvarez**

| Conceptualization | Metropolitan governance implies the participation of all social and political actors engaged in dealing with regional issues, who should find consensus to establish strategies for addressing common issues. It intermediates the local and metropolitan spheres, assisting in the complex issues of regional urban growth. It infers the equilibrium between the social demands and the capacity of response of involved governments through public policies. The “good governance” encompasses clear and adequate mechanisms to negotiate difficult issues where agreement is paramount to resolve regional problems. It also embodies coordination instruments that respect the municipal autonomy and help to define common goals and objectives for all involved, in a just and fair manner. The time of response to the problems could be optimized if they could be dealt with at a regional level. |
| Context | The issue of metropolitan governance is critical as cities become more relevant to the country’s development, and metropolitan regions represent complex systems involving housing, transportations, infrastructure, services, etc. However, the financial resources continue to pose a great challenge to attend the regional needs. The Metropolitan Fund is still directed to unilateral projects that do not attend the regional needs or plans. There are still much to be done in terms of inter-municipal cooperation for governance to work properly. The governance framework should define common goals by all involved actors who also would contribute with efforts and resources to accomplish shared strategies. All citizens of the MRC would be beneficiaries of projects that take into consideration the metropolitan problems, examined under the light of a regular interaction between municipalities. Indicators would help in establish equitable participation, in special in terms of financial resources. Several Issues (e.g. land use, etc.) will be re-examined and eventually regulations, norms and legal procedures will be changed, but without affecting the municipal autonomy. |
| Issues and Challenges | There are increasing problems related to increased urban growth at regional level that a good governance structure should deal with. Conurbation affects all municipalities involved, and spill over problems related to congestion and municipal services lack or overcrowding. Many urban problems transcend municipalities’ borders. A metropolitan comprehensive planning is necessary to address the challenges of traffic congestion, pollution, environmental issues related to climate change (e.g. flooding, hurricanes) and lack of infrastructure (e.g. potable water, pollution of rivers, drainage) because these are issues confronted by all metropolitan municipalities in various degrees. Empty urban areas are prone to invasion and vandalism, and sometimes are associated with the increased insecurity felt by the metropolitan population. Real estate speculation is another challenge at the regional level that has to be dealt with, in |
due to the lack of housing in the region. The labour market is also a challenge because people search for jobs all over the metropolitan region, independently of where they live, increasing unexpected needs of all kinds of services and infrastructure. Existing municipal public policies that treat differently common issues are also a metropolitan challenge because their solutions have to be harmonized and coordinated. The lack of good data at local and regional level is a hindrance to good analysis. The diversity of political parties governing municipalities can be an issue in finding consensus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>All levels of governments should be involved in the creation, implementation and operation of a metropolitan governance structure. In particular, the Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario, Territorial y Urbano (SEDATU) and the Secretaría de Gobernación will have important roles to play when articulating the relationship among the metropolitan municipalities. The politicians should also be involved as, in time, it could inform the creation of a federal public policy for establishing norms, funding and any other special provisions for metropolitan regions. Civil society has an important role in informing and supporting regional policies affecting the metropolitan area (CANERAC, CANADEV are already part of the Comisión Consultativa de Desarrollo Urbano ). Participation of professional associations and academia will also bring vital information and significant approaches to the discussion table. There is a general feeling that it is necessary greater understanding of the meaning, responsibilities and advantages of a metropolitan governance structure, and that it should contribute to changing a more local oriented vision to a distinct, more comprehensive regional view of the metropolitan challenges.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>A Metropolitan Institute, with a technical body and Council would conduct decision making processes related to necessary initiatives, as it would have ways to analyze viability and potential for implementation of actions and metropolitan programs. The three levels of government should be involved in deciding the goals and priorities of the Metropolitan Region, and in special all participating municipalities, that would help in deciding strategic policies and their implementation agenda. However, the autonomy of the municipalities should be respected, and maintained some of their intrinsic powers, in particular the ones that affect the municipal budget (taxes, e.g. land use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>The Federal and State levels should be involved in the provision of funds for the MRC (e.g. CONAGUA, SEDATU). The Metropolitan Fund should be the key source of financial resources, with local contributions and capital subsidies from different fonts. Special care should be given to how the funding is obtained and a formula should be created considering the financial potential of each municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Concepts

| Metropolitan governance and collaborative governance is a metropolitan management framework that engages politicians and civil society in discussing, prioritizing and tackling critical themes for the metropolitan region. There is some emphasis in the direct involvement of mayors of metropolitan municipalities in the decision making process related to infrastructure, but the coordination among and engagement of all actors involved are largely accepted and considered desirable for the efficiency and inclusiveness of the metropolitan management. The involvement of the three levels of government is expected. The “good governance” implies that there is an efficient, well-coordinated and fair approach to the needs of metropolitan municipalities, and that there is a good system of continuous evaluation of programs and actions. The overall wellbeing of the metropolitan “citizen” is considered paramount. A good governance framework is essential for dealing with the increased diversity of the urban scenario, its complexity, and the expectations related to the wellbeing of citizens. |

### Context

| Governance is an important issue for this Metropolitan Region, and should involve public consultation what would assure the adequacy of budgeting priorities. The discussion of norms and procedures among all participant municipalities is also recommended. This discussion would address coordination and responsibility of local and metropolitan governments for specific programs taking into account the implementation of actions and avoiding unnecessary complication. The Metro Region would be more integrated and able to proceed with necessary structural reforms and urban policies, reinforcing inter-municipal relationships and improving regional development. Bogota could be considered a good example of integrated efficiency of urban metro urban policies. |

### Issues and challenges

| The direction and goals of metropolitan growth implies good planning involving all municipalities, and the definition of an adequate ‘institutional model’ is key to overcome issues related to politics, lack of communication among different levels of government and municipalities, inefficiency of urban systems (e.g. congestion, pollution, sanitation, mobility, security, etc.) scarcity of resources (e.g. water, funding) as well as economic opportunities and jobs. Creating consensus among metropolitan stakeholders will direct initiatives to deal with climate change as well as all challenges mentioned above, in summary, it will promote sustainable metropolitan regions. Definition of a common regional goal by all metropolitan municipalities is essential to gain political support. The legal framework is instrumental in establishing a juridical platform for regional actions with regional impact. There is no systematic regional data collection, affecting the definition of priorities as well as a deeper knowledge of issues related to environment, specific needs of services, equipment, and best practices (e.g. Bogota’s legislation, urban policies from Medellin, and Dubai, academic in relevant themes, etc.). An institution like IMEPLAN is a critical asset in position to address strategic regional planning and development, working with local governments in a space of communication, coordination, data collection and decision making, engaging institutions and civil society, and fighting the traditional isolate, insulate view of local urban programs that affect the whole metropolitan region. |

### Participation

| Besides institutions directly engaged in the metropolitan management (infrastructure and provision services and maintenance, planning, etc.), civil society organizations, universities, technical councils and associations should be involved in creating a metropolitan governance framework. This will assure that citizens are well represented. The governance structure proposed should be a technical body, directed by someone well prepared and with broad knowledge however it is impossible to have someone who has expertise in all areas; it should have a group of multidisciplinary specialists to propose, explore and support implementation of decisions in all areas. Advisory councils should also be considered. The relevance of its political role cannot be denied. Thus, the input from politicians – mayors – is fundamental. There are good examples from Brazil, Colombia and other Latin American countries that could helpful. Currently, IMEPLAN has the support of a coordination board for taking decisions, but it is necessary |

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**Table 2: Metropolitan Region of Guadalajara**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision making</th>
<th>to find mechanism to engage stakeholders to attend all society interests. As a metropolitan governance structure, IMEPLAN shall represent the common good. In all steps, there should be always an assurance to all municipalities that they remain independent and have their own roles in the regional development.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>Funding for a metropolitan structure depends on all levels of government, compulsory and agreed upon, but it can and mostly will still be insufficient for all necessary programs and actions. The Metropolitan Fund has to be evaluated and examined under the light of new proposals. A formula should be created in relation to the contribution from participant municipalities, and equity should be sought. Other examples of funding from other cities should be examined in order to determine a better financial resources basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Closing Thoughts

The path forward for governance of the Colima and Guadalajara metropolitan area requires careful choices, and this paper has been designed to help illuminate those. Although it is neither feasible nor desirable to prescribe a governance model for these areas, available evidence suggests the incremental, bottom-up approaches proposed by New Regionalism may be strategic if supported by meaningful, early-stage involvement of civil society and stakeholders. These may help build social capital and evolve into more sophisticated and formalized governance models.

The interview findings demonstrated that there is a sophisticated view about metropolitan governance by the stakeholders involved. There is a deep comprehension of the main issues that are associated with increased urban growth, conurbation, insufficient and inadequate infrastructure and chronic lack of resources. Technical and financial support to deal with amassing problems is constantly reminded as a core issue. It is clear also that the role of politicians is considered important and thus to have them well informed about metropolitan complexities is crucial if good public policies are to be proposed and implemented. No one is naïve about the political difficulties that this represents, but also few are totally pessimistic about the potential to find good allies in all spheres of elected politicians. The need of an adequate legal framework that could address regional issues is universally pointed out.

However, some aspects gathered from the interviewees’ responses that should demand further exploration could be pointed out, for example, the importance of mechanisms to find consensus among municipalities and how appropriate tools should be available for different problems and disagreements. Another case is related to the creation and operation of a metropolitan institution responsible for regional planning. In some cases, it is clear that the interviewee wants a powerful and efficient metropolitan institution, with very little or no political interference; others are not so clear in relation to the operational role of such institution. Also, it is noticeable that the participation of civil society is always mentioned, but mostly for consultative roles, not decision making. Mechanisms to have civil society participation in the processes of creation, implementation and operation of a governance structure are also an issue that was almost absent in the responses. The lack of a strategy to engage municipalities in a common goal is inferred, but not always clearly stated. If this is going to be resolved by a future governance structure, it is vital that they are to be urgently engaged in such discussions, as the metropolitan regions already exist. Another important issue that was touched but may be not emphasized enough by many of the interviewees is the challenge represented by how to establish municipal contributions and needs of regional support that would be proportional and fair to each of the metropolitan cities. How criteria could be developed for this has to be one important issue in-built in the governance structure. The same should be cited related to the municipal potential down-loaded responsibilities to a metropolitan institution. Even with a specific law, and existing metropolitan institutions, it is not clear to the interviewees what would be a better option for defining what should be under the regional institution and what could be maintained as municipal responsibility. The only clear assertion is related to municipal taxes, as it is one of the few sources of financial municipal resources. The absence of this discussion is more obvious in relation to the “soft’ social issues, as in relation to ‘hard’ issues, like water, sanitation, etc., it is clear that much more discussion has been going on.

In terms of the question regarding the expectations in relation to international experiences from Canada and Brazil, the interviewees presented a summary of their own questions, anxieties, curiosity and
expectations regarding metropolitan governance. They mentioned aspects already dealt with in previous questions, but it is important to add to their responses the considerations that follow:

‘Metropolitan governance is a new theme for some of the stakeholders, thus it would be interesting to know other experiences related to the theme. Learning about the activities and experiences of other countries in creating a metropolitan governance framework and what the instruments and the vision they had at the time is very important, as well as the challenges and eventual failures they encountered and the main actions necessary to the implementation of the processes involved. Information that can be given to the presidents of AMG related to the regional, bigger picture on how to guide metropolitan coordination is very important. How to implement forums for public consultation, mechanisms for social engagement as well as how to engage the private sector are all questions to be explored. Experiences in the implementation of systems of waste management, mobility, water provision and adaptation to climate change in cities will be very valuable. It will be interesting also to know about institutional design best practices, legislation, programs and land use management mechanism. How this is done in São Paulo should also be interesting. Commitment of the mayors to regional governance goals, accountability and the tools used to deal with eventual conflicts are important aspects to be explored. To know more about the development of indicators for evaluating the efficiency of regional goals has been cited as important information. In summary, how to get to work better as a metropolis is the critical issue’.

The path forward for governance of the Colima and Guadalajara metropolitan area requires careful choices, and this document has been designed to help illuminate those. Although it is neither feasible nor desirable to prescribe a governance model for these areas, available evidence suggests the incremental, bottom-up approaches proposed by New Regionalism may be strategic if supported by meaningful, early-stage involvement of civil society and stakeholders. These may help build social capital and evolve into more sophisticated and formalized governance models.

Discussion of key political, historical, and cultural features of the current Mexican context as these bear on metropolitan governance is beyond the scope of this paper, but evidence suggests that successful governance also requires attention to the features common to many Latin American cities: strong centralist state history and behaviour; a lack of civil society involvement, ongoing corruption, weaknesses in administrative and technical capacity among local governments, and the relative dominance of the informal sector. These require action beyond the metropolitan or local level. Change in political elites, democratic education and training of citizens and, perhaps most of all, time for metropolitan governance arrangements to become established may also be required.
Bibliography


Appendix 1: Interview Guidelines & Questions

Introduce the project:
- Main objective: To identify characteristics of design, implementation and evaluation of metropolitan policies and structures related to the management of public urban functions of common interest in metropolitan regions.
- Funded by the International Development Research Center, a Canadian Research institution that provides funding to explore issues in developing countries.
- Partnership between the Center for Sustainable Community Development at Simon Fraser University (Canada), Sustainable Cities International (Canada) and Centro Mario Molina (Mexico).

Consent form and agreement for use of information:
- Sign SFU form
- Use of info for publications and educational material (such as a video)

Ask the following questions for Colima:
- What is your understanding of metropolitan/collaborative governance?
- What is the definition of governance and what does “good” governance implies for you?
- In a scale from 1 to 5, how relevant is this topic for your municipality/area
- What are the factors that are making this topic emerge? Explain in detail
- As a (role of the person), how would the people you represent benefit from a metropolitan/collaborative governance framework?
- Do you think metropolitan governance promotes more social equity? How?
- Do you think it will promote unity and region identity? How?
- What legal framework will support a metropolitan governance framework? (Federal, state, local laws)
- Who do you think should be involved in the creation of the framework?
- Who should be responsible for its daily operation, management and funding?
- How do you see civil society engaging in the creation and operation of this framework?
- What opportunities, challenges or obstacles do you perceive to implement and operate such a framework?
- Where do you see funding coming from?
Ask the following questions for Guadalajara:

- What is your understanding of metropolitan/collaborative governance?
- What is the definition of governance and what does “good” governance implies for you?
- In a scale from 1 to 5, how relevant is this topic for your municipality/area?
- What are the factors that are making this topic emerge? Explain in detail.
- How did the Guadalajara Metropolitan Region decide to create the IMEPLAN? What analysis and considerations were taken into account? If you don’t know, which ones do you think should be considered?
- As a (role of the person), how will the people you represent benefit from the implementation of the IMEPLAN?
- Do you think that the IMEPLAN will promote more social equity? And how?
- Do you think it will promote unity and region identity? How?
- What legal framework is supporting the IMEPLAN? (Federal, state, local laws)
- Who was be involved in the creation of the IMEPLAN?
- Who is currently responsible for IMEPLAN’s daily operation and management?
- Who is funding the IMEPLAN? If you don’t know, who do you think should fund it?
- How was civil society engaged in the creation and operation of the IMEPLAN? If you don’t know, how would you see it being involved?
- What opportunities, challenges or obstacles do you perceive to implement an institution like the IMEPLAN?

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1 Rojas 2008.
2 UN DESA 2012.
3 Yaro and Ronderos 2011.
4 Rojas 2008.
5 Keil and Whitehead 2012.
6 Keil and Whitehead 2012.
7 Klink 2008: 78
8 Definition adapted from Oakerson 2010: 19-20
9 Klink 2008: 83
10 Oakerson 2010 p. 28
11 Klink 2008.
12 LeFevre and Weir 2012.
13 Klink 2008.
14 LeFevre and Weir 2012.
16 Kroen 2011.
17 Kübler 2005.
18 According to Kroen 2011, redistributive regionalism is much talked about but rarely implemented due to resistance by richer communities to redistribution of wealth. Kroen cites Hanover, Germany’s experimentation with regional tax-sharing as an example, noting that analysts attribute this to a confluence of factors: public
authority decision-makers who were close to retirement; agencies with a long history of cooperation; and the establishment of a new public authority.

19 Kroen 2011.
20 Kroen 2009, 82.
22 Ambitious research efforts are underway now to collect and compare objectively verifiable data on metropolitan governance systems. For example, one project of Metropolis: World Association of the Major Metropolises, led by the Secretariat for Metropolitan Development in the State of São Paulo, Brazil, is comparing elements about governance arrangements (e.g. administrative structure, budgeting, powers and responsibilities) in the world’s major metropolitan regions. The project selects metropolitan areas for study using UN data on size and density, which serves to eliminate smaller but potentially instructive examples of metropolitan governance, such as Metro Vancouver, Canada. The project does not set out to evaluate how well these governance arrangements actually perform in terms of their powers and responsibilities, or to document informal governance arrangements forged among local governments, private-sector organizations, NGOs, and civil society.

24 Typologies can be found in LeFevre 2008, Slack and Bird 2008, Yaro and Ronderos 2011; Pizorelli et al. 2009.
25 Klink 2008: 124
26 For example, Yaro and Ronderos (2011) cite Toronto as a “best practice” example of metropolitan governance, while LeFevre (2008) describes it as a highly contested amalgamation of municipalities imposed by a higher level of government, lacking in political legitimacy and likely to cause serious conflicts with outer parts of the metropolitan area in the near future.
27 LeFevre 2008.
28 Slack and Bird 2008.
29 Note that this section does not consider urban areas that are so politically fragmented that they do not exhibit characteristics of governance beyond local boundaries, or efforts to roll back unsuccessful metropolitan structures (as in Winnipeg, Canada).
30 LeFevre 2008.
31 For information about the effects of Toronto amalgamation, see Slack and Bird 2013, Boudreau et al. 2006, Sancton 2005.
32 LeFevre 2008.
33 For more information about the CAM, see Cuadrado-Roura and Fernández Güell 2008 and LeFevre 2008.
34 Closed-party lists mean that parties choose the order of candidates and voters choose parties, with candidates winning seats in the order that they appear on the list. The opposite would be that seats are won by individual candidates rather than parties.
35 LeFevre 2008.
36 LeFevre 2008.
37 The first three of these types are described by LeFevre 2008; we have also included a fourth category, single-purpose special districts, as these are a common solution to metropolitan problems and frequently cited by scholars such as Klink 2008.
38 LeFevre 2008:147.
39 Communities over 15,000 people with surrounding independent suburbs may become communautés d’agglomération, with fewer powers and eligibility for lower per-capita budget.
40 This has just changed: starting in 2014, councilors will be directly elected.
41 LeFevre 2008, Boudreau 2006, Meloche & Vaillancourt
42 Note: The term “special district” is frequently used in the literature to describe monosectoral UIAs without reference to their potential to expand into additional policy sectors (e.g. Klink 2008; Slack and Bird 2008), and synonymously with “single-purpose district” or “single-purpose special district” (e.g. Slack and Bird 2008, Feiock 2004, Yaro 2011).
43 Add this source to references re: German Transport Alliances
44 These are also found in Austria and the German-speaking region of Switzerland.
45 LeFevre 2008.
47 Bassett and Marpillero-Colomina 2012.
48 Mizany, K. and A. Manatt 2005 offers an excellent overview of the diversity of special districts as they are understood in the U.S.A.
49 Yaro 2011.

50 Dowding and Feiock (2012) identify another form of governance which we do not consider in this paper due to limited research on occurrence and outcomes in metropolitan areas: “policy network structures that emerge unplanned from interactions among institutional actors [and] coordinate complex decisions” within formal structures. These are said to preserve full local autonomy, require no formal authority, and complement central authority. According to Dowding and Feiock, their development can be aided by federal and state programs. They indicate that formal authority structures in political systems rely on these “informal, self-organized relationships” for performance and stability to buffer the system from changing demands; network members’ interactions over time are said to help them identify reliable allies and build informal enforcement structures that facilitate cooperation across vertical and horizontal institutional boundaries.

51 Acuto 2012 argues that although Sydney has progressed toward being a globally competitive city, the lack of coherent, locally accountable metropolitan governance is driving increasing inequality in the region and superficial attempts at greening. She indicates that state-controlled regional planning is also driven by less visible governance processes with little or no accountability mechanisms, like an “intra-urban hierarchy dominated by the inner local government areas and corporate interests”. Dodson and Gleeson 2003 identify an urgent need for regional governance in this region.

52 LeFevre 2008.

53 For example, Kübler and Schwab 2007; Keil and Whitehead 2012; Acuto 2012.
54 In a now-classic essay, Arnstein (1969) defined eight levels of public participation in decision-making, from least to most meaningful: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, citizen control.

55 LeFevre 2008.
56 For evidence on effectiveness in terms of accountability, see Hulst’s 2005 research about this in the Netherlands.

57 LeFevre 2008.

58 This is the case in the Greater London Authority (see LeFevre 2008).


60 LeFevre 2008.
61 Dowding and Feiock 2012 and Feiock 2004 apply Institutional Collective Action theory to metropolitan governance.

62 Feiock 2004. See also Ostrom’s 1990 classic on cooperative approaches to governance of common property resources.

63 LeFevre 2008.

64 The 1999 Chevènement law in France that enabled creation of communes is one example. See also Yaro 2011; LeFevre 2008.

65 Netherlands example described in Hulst 2005; see also LeFevre 2008 discussion of constitutive policies, such as territorial projects that French communes urbaines and communes d’agglomeration must design before signing a contrat d’agglomeration to access a substantial portion of funding from the central government. The 7-year, €1.2-billion Bordeaux agglomeration contract is an example.

66 Bird and Slack 2008.

67 Schneider et al. 2003.

68 Yaro 2011.

New Regionalist solutions include intermunicipal authorities, voluntary cooperation, and other means of incremental progress toward more formalized and accountable institutions.

According to Klink (2008), this body coordinates national, provincial, and city initiatives aimed at integrated environmental management of the watershed servicing Buenos Aires and 12 surrounding jurisdictions.

These require metropolitan regions to engage in continuing and comprehensive planning on transportation for funding eligibility. This includes long-range visioning, development of alternatives, and scoring and ranking of alternatives.

Schneider et al. 2003
Klink 2008
Klink 2008.
Yaro 2011.
Bird and Slack 2008.

Toronto is an often cited example of this: see discussion in Slack and Bird 2013.

Bird and Slack 2008.
Bird and Slack 2008.
Amalgmated Toronto is an example; see Slack and Bird 2013.

Bird and Slack 2008.
Bird and Slack 2008.
Keil and Whitehead 2012 p.525
Sancton 2005.
LeFevre and Weir 2012: 629.
This is the case in the Greater London Authority (see LeFevre 2008).
Heinelt and Kübler 2005.

Yaro 2011.
Rusk 2005.
Hulst 2005.
Sancton 2005.
LeFevre 2008.

Hulst (2005) cites the Rijnmond Corporation, a directly elected regional government in the Rotterdam region that was created to co-ordinate policies of the 16 municipalities in the Rotterdam metropolitan area, as a regional policy-maker regarded as legitimate by local government, well informed on local policy issues due to extensive consultation, with sufficient authority and the financial resources to conduct cooperation.

This sophisticated organization and process includes “representatives of almost all representative structures of economic, social, and cultural interests”: LeFevre 2008: 171.

LeFevre 2008.

These steps were developed by Yaro 2011 for Colombia but would be equally useful in Mexico.